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1 Introd uction 
Public pensions represent the most important welfare program in Spain, absorb-
ing almost 70 percent of the total expenditure for social protection programs, 
and representing about 11.5 percent of GDP in 1994. Average annual growth 
rate of public pension expenditures over the period 1980-95 has been 13.1 per-
cent, about 1.5 times higher than the GDP growth rate. 
All available studies indicate a progressive worsening of the financial situ-
ation of the Social Security system (sistema de la Seguridad Social), the most 
important public pension program in Spain. While we concentrate here on the 
retirement incentives provided by the current system without addressing its 
long-run viability, a brief overview of its aggregate evolution is useful to place 
the subsequent analysis in a proper perspective. 
The fraction of annual Social Security (SS) expenditures which is covered 
through direct contributions, from either workers or employers, has decreased 
steadily from 89.4 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1995, the difference be-
ing made up by increasingly large transfers from the government. Even the 
most optimistic projections forecast a continuous increase in the current ac-
count deficit of the Spanish SS system. Normalizing to zero the deficit of the 
pension system in 1995, the deficit in 2010 is expected to range between .8 and 
3.5 percent of GDP [Herce (1997)]. The worsening of the deficit reflects the 
expectation that the growth of SS revenues will not be able to keep up with the 
strong increase in SS expenditures, which should grow in real terms between 
2.5 and 3.2 percent annually over the next two decades. 
As we explain in more detail below (Section 3), the current SS system pro-
vides five types of contributory pensions: old-age, disability, widowers, orphans, 
and other relatives. Over the three subperiods 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95, 
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total expenditure on each type of contribution-based pension has grown in real 
terms at annual rates given in Table 1. The most important source of pension 
expenditure growth has been demographic changes, followed by the widening 
of coverage, and the increase in real average pensions. We now provide some 
aggregate indices of the more recent evolution of these three factors. 
Life expectancy at birth has increased by seven years over the last three 
decades, from 69.9 years in 1960 to 76.9 in 1991. This, together with the concur-
rent sharp decline in natality rates and the impact of the aging baby-boomers, 
is reflected in Figure 1, which presents the basic trends in the structure of the 
population of working age (16+) over the last twenty years. We distinguish 
between men and women and 3 broad age groups: 16-24, 25-54 and 55+. The 
fraction of 16-24 reached a peak between 1982 and 1987 and has been falling 
since. The fraction of 25-54 has been declining till 1988 and is now rising as the 
baby boomers get older. On the other hand, the fraction aged 55+ has been 
increasing steadily, although at a decreasing rate. 
Over the three intervals 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95, the annual growth 
rate of the total number of public pensions has been equal to 4.2, 2.8 and 
2.8 percent respectively (Table 1). As of 1994, the total number of contribu-
tory pensions outstanding was equal to 6.9 millions according to the official SS 
records, of which 3.2 millions for old-age, 1.7 millions for disability, 1.8 millions 
for survivors, 168 thousands for orphans and 42 thousands for other relatives. 
The third factor, namely the increase in the real value of average pensions, 
is also captured in Table 1, which reports the annual growth rate of real average 
pensions for each group and time interval. Notice that Spanish pensions are 
not particularly generous, at least with respect to the European average. For 
example, the average pension in 1994 was equivalent to only 47 percent of per-
capita GDP against a European average of 62 percent. In the same year, the 
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average pension was equal to 63 percent of the average wage and 70 percent of 
the pensions were below the minimum wage. 
This fact suggests,as a tentative hypothesis, that the financial imbalance of 
the Spanish system may not come from its particular generosity but, instead, 
from other factors. The aggregate data reported above illustrate two of them: 
the dramatic shift in the demographic structure and the rapid growth of the 
public pension system. As illustrated in Section 3 the latter has come about 
since 1972 through the extension of coverage to various groups with either very 
short contributive histories or with a very low contribution-to-pension ratio. 
A third determinant of the system financial imbalance is the loss of con-
tributions and the increase in pension payments induced by the shortening of 
professional lifes and the parallel growth of early retirement. In this study we 
try to document the extent to which this third factor may be "endogenous" 
to the SS system. We show that the Spanish SS legislation generates strong 
incentives to retire early and that Spanish workers tend to do so. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic 
facts about labor market behavior and social insurance use of older workers in 
Spain. Section 3 describes the evolution of the Spanish system since its inception 
and illustrates in relative detail its current institutional features. Section 4 
presents a set of simulations that illustrate the incentive effects of the current 
system upon labor market participation and retirement decisions. Section 5 
offers some conclusions. Finally, Appendix A describes the main data sets used 
and other sources of information about retirement behavior in Spain, whereas 
Appendix B briefly reviews the recent literature about retirement in Spain. 
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2 Labor market behavior and social insurance use of 
the elderly 
2.1 Historical trends 
Figures 2 and 3 show the historical trends in labor force participation rates 
(LFPR) of older men and women for four age groups: 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 
and 65+. The data are taken from Fermindez Cordon (1996) and consist of 
tabulations based on the Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta de Poblaci6n 
Activa, or EPA) for the period 1965-1994. 
Male LFPR have been falling for all age groups considered. The sharpest 
decline is for those aged 65+ and 60-64. While 40 percent of men aged 65+ 
were labor force participants in 1965, by 1994 this percentage was down to 
about only 5 percent. The fall for those aged 60-64 starts a little later but 
is equally impressive, from about 85 percent in 1970 to little over 40 percent 
in 1994. The decline for the other two age groups is less dramatic, although 
it is worth noticing that, by 1994, the labor force participation rate of men 
aged 55-59 was down to about 70 per cent, and the negative trend seems to be 
continuing. 
Female LFPR present a mixed picture, with a clear downward trend only 
for women aged 65+. For the other age groups considered, we observe a small 
decline in the second half of the 1960s, followed by a rise in the first half of the 
1970s, and a subsequent slow decline lasting until the mid 1980s when female 
LFPR start increasing again, at least for women younger than 60. 
Figure 4 shows the fraction of workers covered by the SS system. The 
denominator of the ratio is obtained by projecting to the population level the 
employement rate resulting from the EPA. The numerator is the number of 
workers contributing to the Old Age and Disability Insurance (SOV!) for the 
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period 1964-75, and the number of workers affiliated to the SS system (en alta 
laboral) after 1979. The data for the period 1976-79 are not reported because 
they are considered to be of poor quality and fundamentally unreliable. 
In 1964, only half of the workers were covered by mandatory insurance. 
Since then, the proportion covered has grown steadily. This is due mainly 
to the progressive integration into the SS system of a number of professional 
pensions schemes (Mutualidades) , to the legislation of mandatory public pension 
for many categories of self-employed workers, and to the widening of coverage of 
the disability insurance plan. Historical details are provided in the next section. 
Notice that the number of workers covered by SS has surpassed, in the most 
recent years, the official employment level. This provides strong support to the 
view that the EPA grossly underestimates the actual level of employment (and 
overestimates, consequently, the level of unemployment). For more details on 
this issue see, e.g. Villagarcia (1995). 
Figure 5 shows the share of population aged 55+ receiving old-age, disabil-
ity, or some other type of pension. Data are again from the EPA, which asks 
respondents to report their status in the week before the survey, distinguish-
ing between being retired, being permanently disabled, and receiving another 
pension different from old-age or disability. The latter category is particularly 
important for women, since it includes survivors' pensions. The upper profile 
indicates the fraction of older men receiving public pensions. The profile imme-
diately below indicates the fraction of older men receiving old-age or survivors' 
pensions. The lower profiles correspond to females. 
The figure shows clearly the steady increase in pension recipiency rates. The 
nature and the dynamics of the benefits, however, are quite different between the 
two sexes. Most men aged 55+ receive old-age or disability pensions, whereas 
survivors' pensions are by far the most common type of benefit among women. 
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In particular, for the years after 1986, for which a reliable corn parison can be 
made, the growth rate of survivors' pensions among females greatly outpaces 
the growth rate of both old-age and disability pensions, the share of which 
remains rather stable at about 20 percent. 
The difference between the two sexes in the relative importance of the var-
ious sources of pension income is readily understood by combining two factors. 
One is the increased coverage of males by means of old-age or disability pen-
sions, the other is the longer life expectancy of females which transforms males' 
pensions into females' survivors benefits. 
Although reliable estimates of replacement rates over time are not available, 
we were able to obtain some information using administrative records from 
SS. The old-age (OA) and disability (DJ) pension replacement rates presented 
in Figure 6 are computed as the ratio between the initial pension award and 
the benefit base or base reguladora (defined in Section 3.4.3) at the time of 
retirement. Unti11985, the benefit base is a very good measure of pre-retirement 
earnings, being computed as the average salary over the last two years of work. 
After 1985, it is computed over a longer period of eight years before retirement 
(see below). 
Female old-age pension replacement rates surge to 100 percent in the early 
seventies. This is due to the fact that in the years immediately after the intro-
duction of the current system, pensions were granted to individuals with very 
short work-histories and, simultaneously, pensions were adjusted to their mini-
mum level. Replacement rates decline rapidly after 1979 as female wages move 
closer to those of men. After 1986, the female replacement rates become indeed 
lower than the male ones. In all other cases, the figure shows a steady decline of 
replacement rates over the period considered, which becomes more pronounced 
after the 198.5 reform (see next section). Because of the way in which the initial 
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pension is computed (see Section 3.3), this phenomenon suggests a continuous 
reduction in either the number of contributory years, or the age of retirement, 
or both. The existence of strong incentives to early retirement is, in our view, 
a critical feature of the Spanish SS system. We will come back to a detailed 
analysis of this issue in the last two sections of the paper. We will argue there 
that the main incentive to early retirement comes from the generous mechanism 
determining the minimum pension. 
2.2 Contemporaneous age patterns 
This section focuses on the age range from 45 to 75. Unless indicated otherwise, 
the data are tabulations based on the pooled EPAs for the second quarters of 
the years 1993-95. 
These results are consistent with the ones obtained using the 1990-91 House-
hold Budget Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares or EPF), which we 
do not report. 
Figure 7 compares cross-sectional LFPR by age for men and women. At age 
45, female LFPR are less than 50 percent, about half the ones of men. After 
that age, LFPR decline steadily with noticeable differences between the two 
sexes. For women, LFPR decline linearly, with a sizeable jump only at age 65. 
For men, the decline tends instead to accelerate with age, at least until age 65, 
and shows two noticeable jumps at ages 60 and 65. 
Figures 8 and 9 show, for each age, the distribution by main activity (em-
ployed, unemployed, disabled and retired) separately by sex. Overall, the pat-
terns of LFPR are confirmed but two interesting features appear, common to 
both men and women. First, the fraction of the population classified as unem-
ployed declines rapidly with age. Second, the residual fraction of individuals 
not belonging to any of the previous four categories (not reported in the Fig-
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ures) increases steadily until age 65 when it suddenly falls. This downward 
jump is due to the award of non-contributory old-age pensions to people aged 
65 who were previously out of the labor force or covered by other welfare pro-
grams (see below). After age 65, there are almost no men left in the residual 
category, whereas the fraction of women classified in this category declines due 
the increase in the fraction receiving survivors' pensions. 
The next set of pictures are based on the Spanish household budget survey 
(Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, or EPF) for 1990. They are meant to 
assess the extent to which transfers from the SS system affect the income of 
older men and women. 
Figure 10 shows the fraction of men that receive some form of public in-
come at each age. Public income, identified in the EPF with welfare payments 
(prestaciones sociales), is broken down into three categories: old-age and sur-
vivors' (OAS) pensions, disability (DI) pensions, and other welfare payments. 
The fraction of men receiving disability pensions increases sharply right 
before age 65, suggesting a strategic use of this kind of pensions to anticipate 
retirement and avoid the cuts that the legislation would otherwise impose on 
old-age pensions. In fact, those who are declared disable can stop working, 
collect a disability pension immediately, and still receive their old-age pension 
in full once they reach age 65. For individuals that have already cumulated 
35 years of work, are younger than 65, belong to SS regimes that do not allow 
for early retirement and do not expect any substantial real wage increase, the 
"disabled first - retired later" strategy is clearly a dominant one. 
A precise assessment of the number of those who participate to or receive 
income from private pension schemes is very hard to come by, due to the lack of 
data. Figure 11 reports data from the EPF and gives a breakdown of the sources 
of family income (earnings, assets, private pensions, and public transfers) by 
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the age of the (male) family head. The graph suggests the irreleyance of pri\'ate 
pensions. Notice that the fraction receiving such transfers, beside being almost 
negligible (less than 3 percent) for both men and women, remains practically 
constant at all ages. 
3 Institutional features of SS 
3.1 Historical evolution 
Mandatory insurance for job related accidents was introduced in 1900, through 
a bill that also authorized the creation of some funds, for public employees only, 
paying disability and retirement pensions. 
In 1919, mandatory retirement insurance (Retiro Obrero Obligatorio) was 
introduced for private sector employees aged 16-65 whose total annual salary 
was below a certain threshold. Contributions to the fund came from both the 
employer and the employee in a 3 to 1 ratio. 
In 1926, a universal pension system for public employees (Regimen de Clases 
Pash'as, or RCP) was established, providing a minimum pension and the option 
of contributing. out of the salary and up to a maximum amount, towards a com-
plementary pension. By the late 1930s, most Spanish employees were covered, 
in one form or another, by some minimal, government mandated retirement 
insurance program. 
With the end of the Republic and the advent of Franco's regime, a number 
of more or less connected changes were implemented. In 1939, Workers' Re-
tirement (Retiro Obrero) \'v'as replaced by Old Age Insurance (Seguro de Vejez). 
While the former was based upon a capitalization system, the latter was from 
the beginning a completely unfunded pay-as-you-go scheme. At the same time, 
the regime promoted the creation of complementary pension funds, called Mu-
tua/ida(ifs y JIontep[os Laborales, which were jointly managed by the :t..,finistry 
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of Labor and the regime-sponsored trade-unions. 
By 1950. the system had acquired its basic organization in two pillars, which 
remained essentially unchanged until the mid 1970s, when the collapse of the 
dictatorial regime brought about major changes. Public servants were all cov-
ered by the RCP. while private sector employees with annual earnings below a 
certain ceiling were covered by the Old Age Insurance. Both public and private 
employees could also enroll in complementary pension plans (the Mutualidades) 
which. despite the apparently private nature, were under complete government 
control. 
Variability in benefit and tax rates across different professional groups and 
sectors of actiyity \\'as not negligible. A ceiling on covered earnings was leg-
islated in 19.50 and updated more or less regularly after that. For most Mu-
tualidadEs, covered earnings were computed as the average annual salary over 
a period of 24 consecutive months chosen by the retiree within the last seven 
years of work. 
3.2 Major reforms since 1960 
The 1963 Social Security Act (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) eliminated 
the income ceiling for enrollment in the Old Age Insurance, unified the various 
contributions for retirement, disability, etc., in a general SS contribution, and 
modified the percentages contributed by the employer and the employee. 
Another consequence of the 1963 reform was the creation of a very large 
number of special funds (Regimenes Especiales) next to the general scheme 
(Regimen GenEra!). generating ajungJe of special treatments and privileges for 
sectors and categories that were either politically close to the regime, or enjoyed 
the support of a particularly strong trade union. 
The 1963 act also defined i for each professional group and sector of activity, 
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the tax base (bases de cotizaci6n) upon which SS taxes were levied. Such tax 
base, hO\\,ever, had little to do with actual earnings. The difference between the 
t\\·o increased sharply over time until the 1972 reform, which effectively linked 
the tax base to wages (overtime pay excluded). 
Besides linking the tax bases to actual wages, the 1972 bill also loosened sig-
nificantly the eligibility criteria and began undoing the system of Mutualidades 
by establishing common replacement rates in place of the previous system where 
each category had its own. Finally, it established the principle that pensions 
should be indexed to both the cost of living and the real wage growth. 
In 1977, a reform bill made a first attempt at harmonizing the many existing 
funds, by reducing the differences in the treatment they offered and by putting 
(in 1979) the administration of the whole system under the newly created Na-
tional Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, or 
I\,SS). Overall. t his process increased the percentage of workers covered by the 
public SS system, as it is clearly reflected by the aggregate data reported in the 
previous section. 
The last major reform process, which came to shape the current regime, 
began in 1985. Three important changes were introduced. First, eligibility 
criteria for disability pensions were tightened. Second, the minimum number of 
years of contributions required to obtain an old-age pension was increased from 
8 to 15. Third, the number of years entering the computation of the benefit 
base was increased from 2 to 8. The reform also provided for a reduction in the 
number of existing special funds, either through their integration in the general 
scheme or by merging them together. This process, which began in 1986, is 
not yet completed, as various small groups of public employees retain their 
pridleges. Overall, the 1985 reform had more impact on the replacement rates 
than on the percentage of covered workers, as the latter had already reached a 
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very high level. 
In 1986, the Spanish Government established a public health insurance sys-
tem (INSALUD) covering the whole population, which was largely financed by 
the contributions to the SS system. This arrangement ended with the budget 
year 1989, when the whole cost of INSALUD was attributed to the general 
Government budget. A set of regulations for complementary private pension 
plans was introduced in 1987, and further modified in 1995. 
Another important change was the introduction, in 1990, of non-contributory 
pensions for elderly people aged 65+ and for disabled people aged 18+, who 
live in households with income below a certain minimum and satisfy a residency 
requirement. Financing of these non-contributory pensions is attributed to the 
general Government budget. 
Finally on June 26, 1997, when this paper was already completed, the Par-
liament introduced a number of changes in the parameters to be used for the 
computation of benefit bases and pensions. The number of contributive years 
over which the benefit base is computed will progressively increase from the 
current 8 to 15 between now and 2001. The formula for the computation of the 
replacement rate Q (see below) has also been made less generous, whereas the 
8% per-year penalty applied to early retirees between the ages of 60 and 65 is 
reduced to 7% for those individuals with 40 or more contributive years at the 
time of retirement. 
3.3 The current situation 
Under the current legislation, public contributory pensions are provided by the 
following programs . 
• "General Social Security Scheme" (Regimen General de la Seguridad So-
cial, or RGSS) and "Special Social Security Schemes" (Reg{menes Es-
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peciales de la Seguridad Social, or RESS): They cover all private sector 
employees, self-employed workers and professionals, members of coopera-
tive firms, employees of most pu blic administrations other than the central 
government (e.g. municipalities, local corporations), the clergy, convicted 
individuals working while in jail, professional athlets, members of the 
Parliament, and unemployed individuals who comply with the minimum 
number of contributory years when reaching 65. The general and the spe-
cial schemes together covered 12.4 million workers in 1996, of which 8.7 
million (70 percent) were covered by RGSS and the remaining 3,7 million 
(30 percent) by the RESS. The latter include five special schemes set up 
for particular classes of workers: 
1. Self-employed (Regimen Especial de Trabajadores Aut6nomos or RETA) , 
covering 2,3 million workers on average during 1996. 
2. Agricultural workers and small farmers (Regimen Especial Agrario 
or REA), covering about 1,2 million workers in 1996, of which 65 per-
cent are employees and the remaining 35 percent are self-employed. 
3. Domestic workers (Regimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar or REEH), 
covering 144 thousand individuals in 1996. 
4. Sailors (Regimen Especial de Trabajadores del Mar or RETM) , cov-
ering 82 thousand workers in 1996, of which 84 percent are employees 
and the remaining 16 percent are self-employed. 
5. Coal miners (Regimen Especial de la Mineria del CarbOn or REMC) , 
covering 28 thousand workers in 1996 . 
• Government employees scheme (Regimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP): It 
includes public servants (both military and civil) currently employed by 
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the central government and its local branches. It also covers, through 
a number of small special funds, all civil war veterans and survivors, a 
variety of semi-public employees, the victims of terrorist attacks, etc. The 
number of workers covered by RCP was 806 thousands in 1994. 
• "Special Funds": This is a family of special funds, remnants of the old 
Mutualidades y Montepios, paying small supplementary pensions and pro-
viding basic health insurance to certain groups of civil servants (MU-
FACE), military personnel (ISFAS) and members of the judiciary system 
(MUCEJU). These pensions complement the basic ones paid by the RCP 
or by the RGSS. 
• "Insurance Systems of Regional Governments and Local Administrations": 
These are small programs, covering employees of certain regional govern-
ments or local administrations, and are financed through transfers from 
the central government. 
• Finally, there exists a long array of small pension plans, covering employ-
ees of other institutions (e.g. the Bank of Spain, a number of formerly 
public banks, many local corporations, special branches of some regional 
government, etc.), which managed to maintain their special treatments 
despite the process of homogenization started in the 1980s. 
The legislation approved by Parliament on June 26, 1997 establishes the 
progressive elimination of all the special regimes by the year 2001. Aside from 
the pension scheme for public employees (RCP), the Spanish SS system will 
then be structured around only two "schemes" for the private sector: one for 
the employees and one for the self-employed. 
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The number of workers affiliated to the general scheme increased from 6.7 
million in 1982 to 8.7 million in 1996. As we have argued already, a large 
part of this growth simply reflects the progressive incorporation of a variety of 
previously autonomous funds. At the same time, the number of people affiliated 
to the special schemes decreased from 3.9 to 3.7 million. OveraIl, the number 
of people affiliated to SS (excluding RCP and the smaIler funds) increased from 
10.6 million in 1982 to the current 12.4 million. 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the affiliated to SS (excluding RCP) 
by program. The fraction affiliated to the general scheme grew from about 63 
percent in 1982 to about 70 percent in 1996, with a corresponding decline of 
the fraction affiliated to the special schemes. It is interesting to notice that all 
special schemes except the self-employed have lost affiliates. The decline has 
often been dramatic, as in the case of domestic workers and smaIl farmers. 
3.4 The general scheme 
This section describes the rules governing old-age and survivors' pensions under 
the general scheme (RGSS), the main SS program in Spain and the benchmark 
for our simulations. Many of these rules also apply to the special schemes 
(RESS) and the scheme for government employees (RCP). The main differences 
will be noted below when we discuss these other programs. 
3.4.1 Financing 
RGSS is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme financed partly by contributions from 
earnings (about two thirds in 1996) and partly by transfers from the Govern-
ment budget (about one third in 1996). 
Contributions are a fixed proportion of covered earnings, defined as total 
earnings, excluding payments for overtime work, between a floor and a ceiling 
that vary by broadly defined professional category. Currently, eleven categories 
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are distinguished. For the first seven of them, floors and ceilings apply to 
monthly earnings. These floors and ceilings are shown in Table 2 for the years 
1990 and 1996. They are approximately equal to, respectively, the professional 
minimum wage and three times the professional minimum wage. For the last 
four categories, floors and ceilings apply to daily earnings and are not reported 
in the Table. 
As the table shows, a process of slow convergence between floors and ceilings 
and across categories is in place. This process is generated by asymmetric 
inflation adjustments and an intentional effort to control total expenditures on 
pensions by slowing down the growth of the higher ones. Over time, these 
modifications have substantially weakened the link between covered earnings 
and lifetime wage and work effort, especially for workers earning relatively high 
wages and salaries. 
SS tax rates have fluctuated over time, being lowered in the early 1980s 
and increased afterwards. The current tax rate is 28.3 percent (it was 29.3 
percent until January 1995), of which 23.6 percent is formally attributed to the 
employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the employee. A tax rate of only 14 
percent is levied on most earnings from overtime work, of which 12 percent is 
paid by the employer and the remaining 2 percent by the employee. 
3.4.2 Eligibility 
Entitlement to an old-age pension requires the number of years of contributions 
to be at least 15 (only 8 were required until 1985), of which at least 2 within 
the last 8 years immediately before retirement. 
As a general rule, recipiency is conditional on having reached age 65 and is 
incompatible with income from any employment that requires affiliation to SS. 
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3.4.3 Benefit computation 
Suppose that the eligibility conditions are met and consider a person aged 65+ 
who retires in month t after n ~ 15 years of contributions. Its initial monthly 
pension Pt is computed as 
where the benefit base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of covered 
monthly earnings Wt-j over a reference period that consists of the last 8 years 
before retirement 
1 (24 96 I) 
BRt = 112 ?: Wt_j + L Wt-j ;~2~ , 
;=1 ;=25 t ; 
and It-j is the consumer price index for the j-th month before retirement. 
The replacement rate O:'n depends on the number of years of contribution 
and is equal to 
{ 
0, if n < 15, 
O:'n = .6+ .02 (n-15), if 15 ~ n < 35, 
1, if 35 ~ n. 
It may be further adjusted in the case of early retirement as described in Sec-
tion 3.4.4. 
A few remarks are in order. First, after 15 years of contributions the pension 
is already equal to 60 percent of the benefit base. After 35 years of contributions 
the pension is equal to the benefit base and there is no direct advantage from 
contributing further, although contributions are mandatory until retirement. 
Second, if there were no inflation and no wage growth in the reference period, 
that is, Wt-j was constant over the last 8 years, then the benefit base would be 
equal to 6/7 = .857 of the last monthly social security wage. This is because 
pensions (and, usually, salaries) are paid in 14 monthly installments, whereas 
monthly social security contributions are levied on yearly salaries divided by 
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12. For a person with 35 years of contributions, the annual benefit base would 
then be equal to the last annual wage. 
Third, earnings in the last two years before retirement are not adjusted 
for inflation. For earlier months, they are adjusted and converted to money 
equivalents of the 25-th month before retirement. In periods of high inflation, 
these aspects of the benefit formula imply that the benefit base may be well 
below the average real wage in the last 8 years. 
Fourth, beginning July 15, 1997, the number of reference years will be in-
creased by one every year until 2001 and could then be increased further up to 
15 years. Moreover, the formula for computing an has also been changed to the 
following 
{ 
0, if n < 15, 
a = .5 + .03 (n - 15), if 15 ~ n < 25, 
n .8+ .02 (n- 25), if 25 ~ n < 35, 
1, if 35 ~ n. 
In all of our simulations we obviously used the old formula, which was in place 
over the relevant sample period. 
3.4.4 Early retirement 
The normal retirement age is 65, but early retirement at age 60 is permitted for 
those who became affiliated to SS before 1967. Currently, more than one third 
of those who retire under the general scheme take advantage of this possibility. 
The current legislation distinguishes between two cases. The first one, rep-
resenting the vast majority of those currently retiring between age 60 and 65 
[Duran (1995), p. 472], is the case of workers who started contributing as de-
pendent employees to some Mutualidad Laboral before 1967. In this case, the 
replacement rate is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year under age 65. 
Table 3 shows how replacement rates vary with age and the number of years of 
contribution. Notice the differentincentive to work an extra year for a person 
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aged 60 and one aged 65, both with 34 years of contributions. In the former 
case, the pension increases from 56.8 to 68 percent of the benefit base, while in 
the latter it only increases from 98 to 100 percent. As of July 15, 1997 work-
ers who retires after the age of 60 with 40 or more contributive years will be 
charged a penalty of only 7 percent for each year under age 65. 
The second case, representing about 10 percent of the early retirees, is the 
case of workers with dangerous or unhealthy jobs (e.g. bullfighters, employees 
of railroads, public transportation companies and airlines, etc.), or workers who 
were laid off for industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation. In this 
case, no reduction applies. Notice that these exemption rights are "portable", 
as the minimum retirement age without penalty, for an individual who was 
previously employed in one of the sectors deemed dangerous or unhealthy, is 
reduced in proportion to the number of years of work spent in such sectors. 
Unless there are collective agreements that prescribe mandatory retirement, 
individuals may continue working after age 65. There is no direct incentive for 
delaying retirement, however, at least for those individuals who have already 
reached 35 years of contribution at the age of 65. The only indirect form 
of incentive would be the prospect of a particularly high wage growth in the 
forthcoming years, as this would proportionally increase the benefit base (recall 
that only the last 8 years of wages are taken into account in this computation). 
For those with less than 35 years of contribution, a small direct incentive to 
postpone retirement is provided by the fact that the ratio of the pension to the 
benefit base grows 2 percentage points per year of contribution until reaching 
100 percent. 
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3.4.5 Maximum and minimum pension 
Pensions are subject to a ceiling legislated annually and roughly equal to the 
ceiling on covered earnings. The 1996 ceiling corresponds to about 4.3 times 
the minimum wage (salario minimo interprofesional, or SMI) and about 1.6 
times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
If the computed old-age pension is below a minimum, then a person is paid 
a minimum pension legislated annually. Minimum and maximum pensions, 
as well as the annualized SMI, are reported in Table 4. Other things being 
equal, minimum pensions are higher for those who are older than 65 or have a 
dependent spouse. 
In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as nomi-
nal wages, whereas maximum pensions grew at a lower rate that is about equal 
to the inflation rate. The ratio between the minimum old-age pension and 
the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from the late 1970s (it was 75 
percent in 1975) until reaching almost 100 percent in the early 1990s. On the 
other hand, the percentage of pensioners of the general scheme receiving the 
minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75 percent in the late 
1970s to 27 percent in 1995. 
In Figure 13 we analyze the relative importance of complements to the 
minimum, that is, the difference between the actual pension amount and the 
"virtual" pension in the absence of minimum pension rules. The sample, from 
administrative SS records as of January 1993, includes people who retired before 
1985 with only 8 years of contributions. 
The fraction of the total pension which comes from complements varies with 
the pension type. It is 10.1 percent for men and 12.5 percent for women in the 
case of old-age pensions, 5.8 and 6.2 percent respectively in the case of disability 
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pensions, and 19.4 percent in the case of survivors' pensions. Not surprisingly, 
the fraction of pensioners who receive complements to the minimum and the 
share of the pension due to complements both decrease with the number of years 
of contribution. For example, people who retire with 10 years of contributions 
get 40 percent of their pension from complements, whereas people who retire 
with 35 years get less than 10 percent from complements. 
It is interesting to note that both indices are higher for men than for women 
for longer contributory lives. This result has to be interpreted with care, how-
ever, since there are very few women (less than 10 percent) among pensioners 
who contributed for 35 years or more, whereas they represent the majority 
among pensioners who contributed for 15 years or less. 
3.4.6 Pension indexation 
Pensions are fully indexed to inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index (In dice de precios de consumo, or IPC). Until 1986, pensions were also 
indexed to real wage growth. 
It should be noted that indexation is to expected inflation, as defined an-
nually by the Central Bank and the Treasury. If actual inflation is above the 
expected one, then the difference is paid only to the pensions that are below the 
minimum wage. No adjustment is made, however, if actual inflation falls below 
the expected one, as it occurred during the last two years. Pensions that have 
already reached the legislated ceiling are not indexed but are automatically 
adjusted with the ceiling. 
While th;s indexation mechanism could, at least theoretically, induce large 
reductions in the real value of higher pensions and a strong tendency to pension 
equalization, in practice this has occurred only to a limited extent. 
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3.4.7 Family considerations 
A pensioner receives a fixed annual allowance for each dependent child that 
is younger than 18 or disabled. In 1996, this allowance was equal to 408,840 
pesetas (pta), corresponding to about 45 percent of the annualized minimum 
wage. In addition, the minimum pension is increased by a fixed amount if a 
pensioner has a dependent spouse (Table 4). 
Survivors (spouse, children, other relatives) may receive a fraction of the 
benefit base of the deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before retire-
ment after contributing for at least 500 days in the last 5 years. The benefit 
base is computed differently in the two cases. If the deceased was a pensioner, 
the benefit base coincides with the pension. If the deceased was a worker, it 
is computed as an average of covered earnings over an uninterrupted period of 
2 years chosen by the beneficiary among the last 7 years immediately before 
death. If death occurred because of a work accident or a professional illness, 
then the benefit base coincides with last earnings. 
The surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the benefit base of the deceased. In 
case of divorce, the pension is divided between the various spouses according to 
the length of their marriage with the deceased. Such a pension is compatible 
with labor income and any other old-age or disability pension, but is lost if the 
spouse remarries. As a token of curiosity, we point out here that the remarriage 
rate among spanish widows is particularly low compared to other countries. 
Surviving children get 20 percent each of the benefit base of the principal 
as long as they are less than 18 or unable to work, and stay unmarried. A full 
orphan who is a sole beneficiary may receive up to 65 percent of the benefit 
base. If there are several surviving children, the sum of the pensions to the 
surviving spouse (if any) and children cannot exceed 100 percent of the benefit 
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base. 
A Spanish peculiarity is the "pension in favor of family members". This 
pension entitles other surviving relatives (e.g. parents, grandparents, siblings, 
nephews, etc.) to 20 percent of the benefit base of the principal if they satisfy 
certain eligibility conditions (older than 45, do not have a spouse, do not have 
other means of subsistence, have been living with and depending economically 
upon the deceased for the last two years). To this pension, one may add the 45 
percent survivors' pension if there is no surviving spouse or eligible surviving 
children. 
There are specific minimum pensions for the different types of survivorship. 
In particular, the minimum pension to a surviving spouse has been raised in 
1992 and is now equal to the minimum old-age pension for a person without a 
dependent spouse. 
3.5 Special schemes 
In this section we sketch the main differences between the general and the special 
schemes. Whereas rules and regulations for sailors and coal miners are very 
similar to the ones for the general scheme, special rules apply to self-employed, 
farmers, agricultural workers, domestic servants, and a few other categories 
not discussed here, such as part-time workers, artists, traveling salespeople, 
and bullfighters. Beside differences in the SS tax rate and the definition of 
covered earnings, an important difference is the fact that the affiliated to the 
special schemes have no early retirement option (exception made for miners and 
sailors). 
The rest of this section focuses on the special schemes for self-employed 
workers (RETA) and for farmers (REA), which together represent 93 percent 
of the affiliated to the special schemes and 86 percent of the pensions that they 
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payout. 
3.5.1 Self-employed 
While the SS tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general scheme (28.3 
percent in 1996), covered earnings are computed differently, as the self-employed 
are essentially free to choose their covered earnings between a floor and a ceiling 
legislated annually. Not surprisingly in the light of the strong progressivity of 
Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously large proportion of self-employed 
workers report earnings equal to the legislated floor. 
In 1996, the floor and the ceiling were equal to 101,940 pta and 374,880 pta 
per month respectively, corresponding to 1.6 and 5.8 times the minimum wage, 
and .5 and 1.9 times the average earnings in manufacturing and services. For 
a self-employed aged 50+, the ceiling was only about half, namely 195,000 pta 
per month, which was about equal to the average monthly earnings. 
A crucial difference with respect to the general scheme is that, under the 
RETA, recipiency of an old-age pension is compatible with maintaining the self-
employed status. This provision effectively configures the RETA pensions as 
pure old-age pensions, completely independent from labor market participation 
decisions. 
Some other important provisions are the following. RETA only requires at 
least 5 years of contribution in the 10 years immediately before the death of the 
principal in order to qualify for survivors' pensions. Under RETA, the latter 
is 50 percent of the benefit base. If the principal was not a pensioner at time 
of death, the benefit base is computed as the average of covereJ earnings over 
an uninterrupted period of 5 years chosen by the beneficiary among the last 10 
years before the death of the principal. 
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3.5.2 Farmers 
In this case, both the SS tax rate and the covered earnings differ with respect 
to the general scheme~ Self-employed farmers pay 18.75 percent of a tax base 
that is legislated annually and is unrelated to actual earnings. In 1996, this was 
equal to 80,490 pta per month, corresponding to 1.24 times the minimum wage 
and about 40 percent the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. 
Farm employees, instead, pay 11.5 percent of a monthly base that depends 
on their professional category and is legislated yearly. In addition, for each day 
of work, their employer must pay 15.5 percent of a daily base that also varies 
by professional category and is legislated annually. 
3.6 Government employees 
We now describe briefly the main differences between the general scheme and 
the RCP, the pension fund for the employees of the central government. 
Public servants are divided into 5 categories, labeled from A to E, corre-
sponding loosely to decreasing schooling levels: A for college grad uates (doctor, 
licenciado, arquitecto 0 equivalente), B for people holding certain kinds of col-
lege diplomas (ingeniero tecnico, diplomado, etc.)' C for high school graduates 
(bachiller 0 equivalente), D for junior high school diplomas (graduado escolar 
o equivalente), and E for individ uals with lower ed ucation levels (certificado de 
escolaridad). There were many more categories before the 1985 reform. For 
each of these categories, the budget law defines every year a theoretical SS wage 
(haber regulador) which is used to compute SS contributions and pensions. The 
implied wage scale has remained relatively constant since 1985. So, for exam-
ple, the ratio of level A to level E wages was equal to 2.39 between 1985 and 
1989, dropped to 2.33 in 1990, and rebounced and remained constant at 2.45 
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afterwards. 
SS contributions are the sum of three parts, each proportional to the leg-
islated covered wage, according to proportionality factors legislated annually: 
a) derechos pasivos (3.86 percent in 1995), b) cuota mensual de Mutualidades 
(1.89 percent in 1995), and c) aportacion del Estado (paid by the government, it 
varies between 6 and 10 percent depending on the sector of the administration). 
To parallel this three-part contribution structure, actual pensions are com-
puted by adding up three sources of benefits: a) the basic pension (derechos 
pasivos), b) a portion directed to the pensioner's family (ayuda familiar), and 
c) a complementary portion coming from the various Mutualidades (ISFAS, 
MUFACE, MUGEJU). 
The basic monthly pension of a public servant who retires in month t af-
ter contributing for n years to RCP is computed as Pt = an BRt , where the 
dependence of an upon the numbers of years worked has been changed quite 
frequently during the last 10 years. For n ~ 15, the last table of proportionality 
factors, legislated in 1990, can be reasonably (but not exactly) approximated 
by 
an = min(l, 1 - .0366 (35 - n)). 
The differences with respect to the general scheme are various. First, while 
the entitlement to a pension still requires at least 15 years of contributions, 
the replacement rate (the ratio of the pension to the benefit base) increases 
somewhat irregularly with seniority, up to 100 percent after 35 years. So, for 
example, 15 years of service give right to a pension equal to only 26.92 percent 
of the benefit base, against 60 percent of the general scheme. After 30 years the 
same ratio has increased to 81.73 percent, against 90 percent for the general 
scheme). Historically, this replacement ratio has been rather unstable as it can 
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be modified year-by-year through the budget law. 
Second, the benefit base is computed as a weighted average of covered earn-
ings, upon which the worker paid the contributions, with weights equal to the 
percentage of the career spent at each level, that is, 
where Pi is the fraction of the career spent on level i and Hit are the covered 
earnings corresponding to level i, as determined by the current law at time t. 
Third, unlike the general scheme, the Rep imposes mandatory retirement 
at age 65. Exception are made for a few special categories, such as university 
professors and judges. On the other hand, the Rep allows for early retirement 
at the age of 60, without any penalty for public servants with at least 30 years 
of service (20 for military personnel). 
A fourth important difference with respect to the general scheme is compat-
ibility between Rep pensions recipiency and income from continuing to work. 
In a number of special cases, Rep pensioners are allowed to keep a public sec-
tor occupation, as long as this does not provide them with a "regular flow of 
income" (for example, this is the case of members of legislative bodies). More 
importantly, the legislation allows Rep pensions to be cumulated with earnings 
from employment in the private sector. 
It should be noted that those who leave the public administration after 
contributing the minimum number of years but before reaching the retirement 
age, can claim an Rep pension once they reach age 65. The benefit base used 
to compute such pension does not refer to the time when the individual left the 
pu blic administration but is instead the one legislated for the year when they 
turn 65. Furthermore, any future modification in the law will have no impact 
upon the pensions which are already being paid. The latter will be forever 
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regulated by the legislation of the time when the individual matured the right 
to the RCP pension. 
When a public servant is dismissed because of disability (and therefore starts 
drawing a disability pension) or dies (and the survivors are therefore entitled 
to a pension), the missing years between the person's age at the time of the 
event and 65 are counted as actual years of service in the computation of either 
the disability or the survivors' pension. Should the disability be caused by an 
accident while on duty, the disability pension is doubled. 
3.7 Disability pensions 
The SS system provides insurance against both temporary and permanent ill-
ness or disability. 
3.7.1 Temporary illness or disability 
The su bsidy for temporary illness or disability (incapacidad laboral transitoria) 
was not regulated by the 1985 reform, and its terms of provision have undergone 
frequent changes. 
Eligibility requires affiliation to the SS system for a minimum period that 
depends upon the nature of the covered risk. Common illness requires only 180 
days of contributions during the last 5 years, paid maternity/paternity leave 
requires at least 9 months before the date of delivery and 180 days during the 
last 12 months, whereas no minimum eligibility criterion is imposed for work-
related accidents or illnesses. 
The benefit base depends on actual earnings during the last 12 months. In 
case of common illness or work-unrelated accident, the subsidy is equal to 60 
percent of the benefit base for each day of absence between the 4-th and the 
20-th, and to 75 percent of the benefit base aftwerwards until the maximum 
period is reached. It is always equal to 75 percent in case of work-related 
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accident or illness and in case of maternity/paternity (only one of the partners 
being allowed to use the subsidy per each child). The maximum period for 
which the subsidy can be received is 18 months, after which the worker has 
either to return to work or be classified as "permanently disabled" . 
3.7.2 Contributive disability pensions 
Permanent disability pensions have played an important role in allowing Span-
ish workers to retire at ages earlier than 60. In particular, they have been used 
extensively during the late 1970s and early 1980s as an early-retirement mech-
anism for workers in restructuring industries (shipbuilding, steel, mining, etc.), 
or as substitutes for .long-term unemployment subsidies in depressed regions. 
The total disability rate (as a percentage of the workforce) doubled in less than 
ten years, from about 0.7 percent in 1975 to 1.5 percent in 1983. The 1985 
reform, by tightening the requirements, managed to bring the phenomenon un-
der partial control. Disability rates have since decreased, stabilizing around 0.6 
percent. 
Disability pensions are distinguished into contributory and non-contributory. 
This section deals with the contributory pensions. The non-contributory ones 
are dealt with in the next section. 
Eligibility and pension amounts depend on the level of disability. The 1985 
reform distinguished four levels of permanent disability characterized by in-
creasing severity. Since then, the legislation has formally reduced them to 
three, but has also created a special subcase of the first level with the explicit 
purpose of using the disability funds to subsidize the dismissal of old workers 
from certain sectors or geographic areas. 
The first level (incapacidad permanente total para la profesi6n habitual, or 
IPT) corresponds to inability to do the usual job. A special subcase (incapaci-
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dad permanente total cualificada para la profesi6n habitual, or IPTC) applies 
only to employees older than 55 which are in particular socio-economic situa-
tions. The second level (incapacidad permanente absoluta, or IPA) corresponds 
to inability to do any kind of job. The third level (gran invalidez, or GI) re-
quires, in addition, continued attendance by other persons in order to carry out 
the basic vital functions. 
When disability is caused by an ordinary illness, eligibility to a pension 
requires from 5 to 15 years of contributions, depending on the age when the 
person fell ill and the seriousness of the disability. There is no contributive 
requirement when the disability is caused by an accident, whether or not work-
related, or a professional illness. 
Eligibility requirements are fairly complicated. We try here to streamline 
their presentantion. In the cases of IPA or GI, 15 years of contributions are 
required, of which at least 3 during the last 10 years. For the other two cases 
(IPT and IPTC), eligibility depends on age. For persons aged 26 or younger, 
the requirement is half of the number of years between the age of 16 and the 
age when disability began. For persons older than 26, the requirement is either 
5 years or a fourth of the number of years between the age of 20 and the age 
when disability began, whichever is largest. Furthermore, at least a fifth of the 
required contributory years must have occurred during the last 10 years. 
The benefit base depends on the source of disability. In case of ordinary 
illness, it is computed as for old-age pensions. For work-unrelated accident, it is 
the average annual wage over a period of 24 consecutive months chosen by the 
person within the last 7 years of work. For work-related accident or professional 
illness, it is the average wage in the last year of work. 
The pension equals 55 percent of the benefit base under IPT, and increases 
to 7·5 percent under IPTe. In case of IPA, it is equal to 100 of the benefit base, 
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whereas for GI it is equal to 100 percent of the benefit base plus another ·)0 
percent covering the person taking care of the disabled. 
Disability pensions are indexed to inflation like the other pensions of the 
RGSS. Unlike the latter, however, disability pensions may be kept while earn-
ing income from a job different from the one for which the disability (even a 
complete one) was determined. 
We mentioned earlier that disability pensions were awarded very generously 
until 1985. This is illustrated in Figure 14, which reports the distribution of 
male disability pensions outstanding in 1993, by age and year of award, based 
on administrative records from SS. For all age groups, awards peak between 
1980 and 1982, when the growth rate of the number of outstanding disability 
pensions reached 6 percent a year. Between 20 and 25 percent of the outstanding 
disability pensions were granted during those years which correspond to the 
most severe post-war recession in the Spanish economy. For women, a very 
similar picture is obtained. 
The extent to which disability pensions may have been used as instruments 
to absorb the reduction of employment in certain sectors of the Spanish economy 
is evident in Table 5 which reports the percentage ratio between the number of 
disability pensions paid and the number of workers covered by the various SS 
programs for the years between 1981 and 1994. 
While certain sectors are clearly characterized by a higher risk of work 
related accidents, this fact cannot explain the persistently higher percentage 
of disabled among the domestic or the agricultural workers, nor the strong 
countercyclical pattern of the disability ratios reported. 
A second interesting element is the age distribution of the ne\v recipients 
of disability pensions. In 1994, for example, the average age of ne\v recipients 
was of 51.7 years on average, with a value of 50 for the RGSS and of .5-! .. 5.5.6 
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and 57.9 respectively for RETA, REA and REEH. Table 6 shows, for each SS 
program and each level of disability, the fraction of new disability pensions 
awarded in 1994 to individuals aged 55+. 
Criteria are now much stricter, although Court rulings often recognize claims 
to a pension that have been rejected by the SS administration. At least in 
principle, a person receiving a disability pension may be subject to periodic 
checks in order to determine whether the conditions for a pension are still met. 
3.7.3 N on-contributory disability pensions 
They are granted, through a special branch of the SS system called Instituto 
Nacional de Servicios Sociales (INSERSO), to disabled people aged 18 to 65 
who are ineligible for contributory pensions, have been legal residents of Spain 
for at least 5 years (of which at least 2 immediately before applying for such 
pension), and whose annual income is below a certain threshold. INSERSO 
also provides its beneficiaries with basic health insurance, free medicines, and 
other complementary social services. 
In 1990, a number of pre-existing non-contributory programs were ratio-
nalized and unified under INSERSO. As of 1995, the total annual budget of 
INSERSO was 418 billions pta, of which 64 percent were direct Government 
transfers while the rest was financed through SS contributions. Just to give 
an idea of the relative magnitude of this program, which represents about 0.7 
percent of Spanish GDP, notice that total expenditures for the public university 
system in 1995 was only slightly higher, at about 0.9 percent of GDP. 
Of the total annual budget of INSERSO in 1995, about 39 percent was 
spent either in direct monetary transfers or services to disabled individuals, 
about the same amount went to non-contributory old-age pensions (see next 
section), 20 percent was transferred to the regional governments (Comunidades 
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A utonomas) providing similar services, and 2 percent covered INSERSO ad-
ministrative costs. 
The basic annual disability pension paid by INSERSO in 1996 was 498,120 
pta, corresponding to 55 percent of the minimum wage (SMI) and 19 percent 
of average monthly earnings during the same year. Such amount may vary 
according to the economic and physical conditions of the individual and may 
be increased up to 50 percent. 
At the end of 1995, there were about 163 thousands recipients of non-
contributory disability pensions residing in Spain, of which 36 percent were 
males and 64 percent females. Another 198 thousands people (22 percent males 
and 78 percent females) received one of three other monetary subsidies also ad-
ministered by INSERSO. 
3.8 Other transfer programs 
We now describe a few other transfer programs that are either conditioned on 
age, or for which the elderly can qualify based solely on having low incomes. 
3.B.1 Unemployment benefits 
There exists a special subsidy for unemployed people that are older than 52, 
lack income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least 
6 years in their life and, except for age, satisfy all requirements for an old-age 
pension. This subsidy pays up to 75 percent of the minimum wage and may 
be received until the person reaches the age at which it can access an old-
age pension. Years spent unemployed count as contributive years towards an 
old-age pension. 
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3.8.2 Non-contributory old-age pension 
A person aged 65+ who does not qualify for an old-age pension, is entitled to 
a non-contributory pension (pension de jubilaci6n no contributiva) if he/she 
has been a legal resident of Spain for the last 10 years and his/her annual 
income is below a certain threshold. This program is also administered by 
INSERSO. Recipiency of such a pension guarantees recipiency of public health 
care assistance and other benefits available to SS pensioners. 
The annual pension amount is equal to the minimum income threshold and 
both depend on whether the person lives with others or not. If the person does 
not live with others, then the pension is equal to the basic amount paid out 
by INSERSO to disabled individuals. If the person lives with others, then the 
pension amount varies with the number of household members. 
At the end of 1995, 186 thousands people received a non-contributory old-
age pension from INSERSO. Of these, 14 percent were males and 86 percent 
females. 
3.8.3 Other programs run by INSERSO 
In addition to its duties in the field of disability and old-age pensions, INSERSO 
runs a variety of other programs aimed at the elderly population. These pro-
grams include creating and maintaining residential and day-care centers open 
to retirees aged 60+ and their spouses, and managing the "Social Thermal Pro-
gram" (Programa de Termalismo Social) and the "Program for Elderly People's 
Holidays" (Programa de Vacaciones Tercera Edad). The latter two programs 
offer paid or subsidized vacations to pensioners or people aged 65+, as well as 
paid or subsidized stays at spas and thermal resorts within the country. The 
spouse of an eligible person is also covered by the program. 
Recently, most regional governments have also begun to provide a number 
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of services for retired people, from subsidized holidays to reduction in the cost 
of public transportation, special medical and psychological care, special houses 
for the elderly, etc. 
3.9 Private pensions 
Private pension coverage is voluntary but not very widespread. Yet, the number 
of participants to private pension plans has more than doubled in the last few 
years, from 628 thousands in 1990 to 1,525 thousands in 1994 [de las Fuentes 
and Gonzalo (1996), p. 255). Assets of private pension funds still represent only 
a small but growing fraction of GDP, estimated to be 4.7 percent in 1997 [de 
las Fuentes and Gonzalo (1996), p. 251]. 
The main incentive to participation is tax deferral. Contributions can be 
entirely deducted from taxable income up to a maximum (equal to 1 million pta 
in 1996, corresponding to 1.1 times the annualized minimum wage), provided 
that they do not exceed 15 percent of total annual income. Upon recipiency, 
pension benefits are treated as regular components of labor income and taxed 
accordingly. 
There are three forms of organization of a private pension plan. The first 
(sistema asociado) , open to all members of the association that promotes the 
plan (e.g. a trade union), is rather rare. The second (sistema de empleo) , open 
to all employees of the firm that promotes the plan, is confined to a few large 
firms, mainly publicly owned, in the banking and electricity sectors. The third 
(sistema individual) is open to everybody and is the predominant one, covering 
about 85 percent of the participants to private pension plans. 
3.10 Rights of older workers 
Only public sector employees are subject to mandatory retirement. The manda-
tory retirement age is normally 65, but it can be earlier for certain categories 
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(military, police, etc.). There is no mandatory retirement in the private sec-
tor, unless it is specifically contemplated by collective agreements, which occurs 
rarely. 
In principle, age discrimination is prohibited by the law. Indeed, a govern-
ment attempt of introducing mandatory retirement at age 69 was rejected by 
the Spanish Supreme Court on the ground that it would represent a form of 
age discrimination that violates constitutional principles. 
4 Retirement incentives under the SS system 
Vve now present the results of calculations carried out to evaluate the retire-
ment incentives provided by the Spanish SS system. These calculations refer 
only to the general scheme. We exclude disability insurance because of two rea-
sons. First, it is now more severely screened than during the 1980's. Second, 
the extent to which it is used as an early retirement device follows political 
criteria that vary greatly between regions and sectors and cannot be properly 
formalized. Private pensions are also excluded, since they are voluntary and 
only cover a very small fraction of the workforce. 
Replacement rates are net of SS contributions and personal income taxes. 
Although there is no difference in the tax treatment of labor earnings and 
pensions, our simulations take into account the effects of the highly progressive 
nature of the Spanish tax system. This does not affect the qualitative picture, 
but it has a sizeable impact upon the final magnitudes. In order to provide 
the reader with a clearer picture of the powerful role that, over and above the 
pension system, a very progressive income tax schedule may play in determining 
labor supply decisions, we also report simulation results gross of income taxes 
for some of the most significant cases. 
Exact calculations of the after-tax wealth and replacement rates are com-
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plicated by the fact that the number of bend points in the Spanish marginal 
tax schedule is high (34 in 1985 and still 17 in 1995). As an approximation, 
we proceeded as follows. We first used the 1995 tax schedule to trace out the 
relationship between average tax rate (net of standard deductions) and income 
(net of SS contributions paid by a worker). We then fitted by least squares a 
fourth-order polynomial to this relationship. Finally, the estimated coefficients 
were used to determine after-tax income for all previous and subsequent years. 
4.1 Base case 
Our base case is a male employee, born on January 1, 1930, who has been 
contributing to SS without interruption since he turned 20, on January 1, 1950. 
He reaches the early retirement age of 60 in 1990 and the normal retirement 
age of 65 in 1995. He is married to a woman who is three year younger and 
never worked. They have no dependent children and their conditional survival 
probabilities at each age are equal to the ones obtained by the latest mortality 
tables published by the National Statistical Institute (INE) with reference to 
the year 1990. We assume that the survival probabilities of the husband and 
the wife are independent. 
Our base-case worker has a real discount rate of 3 percent and his age-
earnings profile has been constructed as follows. First, using the EPF for 
1980-81, we computed median annual earnings in 1980 for a full-time, non-
agricultural male employee born in 1930. We then predicted annual earnings in 
all other years using the annual growth rate of nominal earnings, as computed 
by the INSS. After 1995, we assumed an annual growth rate of nominal wages 
of 4.5 percent and an annual inflation rate of 3 percent. These assumptions are 
in line with the main macroeconomic scenarios summarized in Herce (1997). 
Simulations start in year 1985, when our base-case worker turns 55 and 
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completes 35 years of contribution, and run for each year until he turns 70, in 
year 2000. At age 55, his benefit base is already equal to 100 percent of the 
average wage during the last eight years of work. For the period between 1985 
and 1996, we use the historical data for all the relevant SS parameters. For the 
subsequent years, SS tax rates are assumed to remain constant at their 1996 
level, the pension is assumed to be perfectly indexed to price inflation, whereas 
the floors and ceilings on earnings, as well as the minimum and maximum 
pensions, are assumed to grow at the same rate as nominal wages. 
Our basic hypotheses are the following. First, if the worker stops working 
before age 60, then he elects to begin receiving his old-age pension at age 
60, which is the earliest possible, whereas if he stops working past the age of 
60, then he starts receiving his old-age pension immediately. Second, if he 
stops working before age 60, then he receives no benefits or unemployment 
compensations in the interim years until he starts drawing a pension. Third, 
the wealth calculations are all net present values as of January 1, 1995. 
It may be worth summarizing the main qualitative effects of working one 
more year beyond age 60 in the simulations that we are about to present. 
1. It may increase SS benefits by increasing the benefit base BRt or the 
replacement rate Q n (see Section 3.4.3). The benefit base increases if 
earnings from the extra year of work exceed average earnings during the 
last 8 years. The replacement rate increases if the worker has contributed 
for less than 35 years, in which case an extra year of work buys an extra 
2 percent of the benefit base. If the worker has already contributed for 35 
years, as in the base case, only the effect on the benefit base is relevant. 
2. It reduces the penalty for early retirement by 8 percentage points. 
3. It reduces by one year the expected period over which the worker will 
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receive a pension. 
4. It implies paying additional SS contributions. 
5. The marginal tax rate on labor income may turn out to be higher than 
the marginal tax rate on pension income, due to the high progressivity of 
the Spanish income tax schedule. This effect is likely to be important for 
workers that are in the higher portion of the earnings distribution. 
Table 7 presents our calculations of replacement rates, SS wealth (SSW), 
SSW accrual (the changes in SSW with respect to one year earlier), SSW ac-
crual rates (the rates of change in SSW), projected earnings, and the implicit 
tax/subsidy rates on continuing to work (minus the ratio between SSW accrual 
and projected earnings) at each age between 54 and 69. Both earnings and 
SSW wealth are net of personal income taxes and are expressed in thousands 
pta at 1995 prices. 
SSW starts up at 11.3 million pta (about $87,000), but it loses about 15 
percent of its value between age 54 and age 59 because the growth of median 
wages during the period 1986-90 has not been enough to compensate for the 
additional contributions paid. SSW rises again between age 59 and age 63, 
mainly because of the progressive reduction in the penalty for earlier retirement 
(effect (2)), but falls very rapidly after age 64, when additional years of work 
add nothing to the expected pension amount while effects (3)-(4) become very 
strong. As a result of this, the implicit tax rate on continuing work increases 
rapidly between age 54 and age 58 t when it reaches 36 percent. It turns negative 
(subsidy) between ages 60 and 62 as the penalty associated to early retirement 
is progressively reduced. The net tax or subsidy is almost zero at age 63, but 
becomes again positive (tax) and rapidly increasing afterwards. 
Notice that the net replacement rate increases from about 60 percent at 
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age 59 to about 100 percent at age 65, and declines slightly afterwards. Also 
notice that SSW reaches its maximum value at age 54, long before the worker 
is allowed to retire. 
4.2 Other cases 
Table 8 presents the incentive calculations for the case of a single worker. The 
main difference with respect to the base case is that the household he represents 
(missing a female spouse) has smaller effective survival probabilities at each 
age, resulting in a lower SSW. The age profile of tax/su bsidy rates is not very 
different from the base case, except for the fact that there is hardly any su bsidy 
for continuing work between age 60 and age 63. In other words the reduction in 
the expected length of time over which pension benefits will be received (effect 
(3)) and the higher marginal tax rates on earnings completely wash out with 
the increase in the benefit base brought about by effects (1) and (2). Also in 
this case, SSW is maximized at age 54. 
Table 9 presents the incentive calculations for the case of a median wage 
profile with "incomplete" earnings history. This worker started working at age 
30, so that he does not fully qualify for a pension until he reaches age 65 in 
1995. The high tax rate on continuing workg at all ages between 55 and 59 
is counter-intuitive but it helps illustrating the dramatic importance of a sixth 
effect embedded in the Spanish SS system, the "minimum pension effect". 
If the worker stops working at age 55, with only 25 years of contributions, 
the pension that he will receive after turning 60 will be low and hit the lower 
bour~d on pensions when he reaches age 64. Since minimum pensions grow at 
the same rate as nominal wages, there is no advantage in working one extra 
year in order to raise the initial pension, as the latter is in any case low and 
going to be equal to the minimum pension after just a few years. Notice that 
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the situation is completely different if the worker considers retiring when he 
turns 60. In this case, as shown in Table 3, working one extra year till age 61 
would increase his pension from 54 to 62.6 percent of the benefit base. 
Table 10 differs from the base case because we used the 10th percentile of 
annual earnings as our 1980 anchor. Given the 1980 anchor, annual earnings for 
all other years are predicted as in the base case. Table 11 presents a parallel set 
of calculations using the 90th percentile of annual earnings as our 1980 anchor. 
Tax/subsidy rates for these two cases are also presented in Figure 15 along with 
the base case. 
We have already seen that the incentives to retire at the earliest possible 
date are much stronger for individuals with an incomplete earning history. The 
bias of the system toward "forcing out" Iow-wage earners is confirmed by the 
different patterns of the tax/subsidy rate faced by individuals at the 90th and 
10th percentile of the wage distribution. Whereas for the former there is an 
incentive, stronger than for the base case, to keep working past 60 and until 
about the age of 63-64, for the latter the disincentive to do so peaks at 60, both 
in terms of accrual and tax/subsidy rates. 
Figure 15 also shows that the tax rate for low-wage earners increases sharply 
in the 60-64 age range, contrary to what happens to high-wage earners. In other 
words, should a Iow-earnings individual be working at the age of, say, 61, he 
would still find it advantegeous to quit immediately, whereas this is not true 
for the base case or a high-earnings person. 
Table 12 provides the reader with a further appraisal of the extent to which 
the minimum-pension mechanism creates incentives to early retirement for low-
wage earners. It reports tax/subsidy rates with and without minimum pensions 
in the base case, the incomplete earning history case and the 10th percentile 
case. 
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The impact on the incentives to early retirement is very strong for the 
low-income individual. The variation caused by the minimum-pension on the 
implicit tax from continuing to work is already very high at the age of 55 it 
peaks at 60 and remains substantial also at much later ages. For a worker with 
incomplete earnings history the effect of the minimum-pension provision is also 
quite relevant until the age of 60 but vanishes rapidly afterwards. Instead the 
difference caused by the existence of the minimum pension on the tax/subsidy 
for the base case worker is always negligible. 
4.3 Discussion 
Our first concern is with the relationships between the incentives effects we 
have computed and the retirement facts available. 
Figures 16 and 17 show hazard rates by age for men and women respectively. 
The hazard rate is defined here as minus the percentage change in the cross-
sectional age-participation profile. For men, the hazard increases smoothly 
with age and shows clear peaks at 60 and 65 corresponding, respectively, to 
the Spanish early and normal retirement ages. This is consistent with our 
calculations which show a strong incentive to retire either as early as possible 
(age 60) for low income earners and/or workers with incomplete histories and 
at 65 for everybody else. 
Among women things are harder to judge. The behavior of the hazard rate 
for women is very herratic at almost all ages and there are various small peaks at 
ages between 52 and 61, followed by the prominent one at age 65. Our reading 
of the data is that the only significant peaks in the hazard for women occurs 
at ages 61 and 65. All the other ones are likely to reflect pure sample noise, 
although one could rationalize the presence of a spike at age 54 through the 
interaction between eligibility requirements and minimum pension provisions. 
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Next, we would like to verify if the recent trends in the patterns of retire-
ment are also consistent with the structure of incentives we have derived. It is 
pointless to apply our calculations to years before 1985. In fact, due to the slow 
implementation of the 1985, reform only very recent years may reveal anything 
informative with respect to the working of the curren system. 
Table 13 (based on SS administrative data) reports the distribution, accord-
ing to the age of the pensioner, of the new retirement pensions awarded by the 
general scheme (RGSS) during the year 1991 and 1994. For workers aged 64 or 
less we also report the percentage of the new pensioners who, for the reasons 
detailed earlier, were exempted from the 8 percent penalty generally applicable 
for each year of early retirement. 
The results are startling: in spite of the fairly heavy penalties associated 
with early retirement, more than 40 percent individuals retire at age 60 or 
earlier. Furthermore the percentage of those retiring earlier than 65 has been 
increasing steadily in the last few years, from 64 percent in 1991 to 70 percent 
in 1994. The intermediate years (not reported) are perfectly consistent with 
this trend. 
Summing up: the Spanish SS system makes retirement at earlier ages than 
65 the only rational strategy. Indeed, for workers with earning profiles below 
the median or with incomplete earning histories (a situation particularly fre-
quent among women), the incentive to retire as early as possible, i.e. at age 
60, is particularly strong. The available data on hazard rates and the recent 
retirement patterns are completely consistent with this prediction. 
5 Conclusions 
The Spanish pension system has witnessed a remarkable evolution in the last 
25 years, moving away from a collection of dispersed and uncoordinated profes-
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sional schemes toward a more uniform and comprehensive public system. Such 
process has generated a tumultuos growth in the size and nature of the public 
pension schemes, as well as a rapid increase in the number of retirees with short 
contributive histories receiving the minimum public pension. Together with the 
dramatic demographic changes affecting Spain since the late seventies, the con-
tinuos enlargement of the public pension system has been a major cause of 
the large financial imbalances which have come about in the last decade. This 
evolution is not yet completed and the recently enacted changes (June 1997) 
suggest that further razionalization and uniformization of treatments will be 
taking place between now and the beginning of the next century. 
A third factor underlying the emergence of financial distress is the strong 
reduction in labor force participation rates among individuals aged 55-65, which 
began between 1975 and 1980 and is still taking place. This paper examines 
the interplay between the incentives generated by the public pension system 
and the decision to retire after the age of 55. We quantify such incentives by 
computing measures of Social Security Wealth and of the implicit tax/subsidy 
to keep working, generated by the current system. 
Our findings support the intuitive idea that pensions-induced incentives 
matter for the labor supply behavior of Spanish workers. While the Spanish 
system does not pay a particularly generous average pension relative to GDP 
per-capita, its "generosity" concentrates in providing relatively large minimum 
pensions to individuals with below average working histories and/or low wages. 
We show how this fact generates very strong incentives for this people to retire as 
soon as possible. At the same time, the pension system provides workers earning 
average or above average salaries and complete working histories, with relatively 
weak financial gains from not retiring after the age of 60. These financial gains 
completely disappear and turn into losses around the age of 63, particularly for 
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workers who have already reached 35 years of contributions. We have also shown 
how the disability insurance system is being used "strategically" by individuals 
who cannot legally anticipate retirement (e.g. self-employed and farmers) to 
actually achieve early retirement. 
The combination of these three salient features of the Spanish legislation 
seems to account well for the observed increase in the percentage of early retirees 
among Spanish new pensioners during the nineties. 
It should be stressed, though, that the possibility of retiring before the age 
of 65 is, according to current legislation, restricted to those workers who began 
their contributive lifes before 1967. While this group represents today the bulk 
of the labor force nearing the age of retirement, its quantitative relevance will 
be rapidly decreasing in future years. 
It is yet unclear if such privilege will be progressively extended also to 
invididuals who began contributing after such date. Political pressure toward 
such extension is currently being exercised from various parts and the final 
outcome is hard to predict. 
Legislation just enacted (June 26, 1997) is ambivalent on this matter. On 
the one hand, it links more closely initial pensions to lifelong contributive his-
tories, thereby starting to cut down on opportunities for "pension purchases" 
especially among self-employed. On the other, it mildly reduces the penaliza-
tion for retiring younger than 65 for individuals with long contributive lifes and 
it leaves untouched both the disability and the minimum pension mechanisms, 
which we have singled out as the most powerful incentives for early retirement. 
If anything, in fact, the extension from 8 to 15 of the number of years 
over which the benefit base is computed may have the effect of increasing the 
number of individuals for which the minimum pension is binding. As we have 
documented, workers expecting to receive a minimum pension have a strong 
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incentive to anticipate retirement. The final outcome of the recent legislation 
may therefore be that of just increasing the proportion of the work force for 
which such incentive matters. 
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A Data appendix 
In what follows we briefly describe the most important data sources employed 
in this chapter. We also mention some other potentially useful data sources. 
A.I Microdata 
A.I.I Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa (EPA) 
This is a quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish households car-
ried out by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). It contains fairly 
detailed information on labor force status, education and family background 
variables but, unfortunately, no information on wages and incomes. This fea-
ture is common to most European-style labor force surveys. Publicly released 
cross-sectional files are available from 1976. 
From 1987, INE also releases the Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa Enlazada, 
which is the panel version of EPA obtained by exploiting the rotating cross-
section nature of the survey. It contains fewer variables, but it permits to 
follow individuals for up to 6 quarters. 
A.I.2 Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF) 
It is a cross-sectional household budget survey carried out by INE in 1973-
74, 1980-81 and 1990-91, with reference to income and expenditure in the 
previous calendar year. The 1990-91 sample, used in this paper, contains 21,155 
households and 72,123 persons. 
A.I.3 Administrative records from Social Security 
The third microdata set used in this paper is a random sample of 1 every 
200 pensioners on file at the INSS on January 1993. The sample consists of 
32,366 observations out of a universe of 6,473,200 pensioners. The data pro-
vide information on initial and current pensions. The difference between these 
49 
two concepts is broken down into revalorization and complement to minimum 
pension, which permits us to construct a measure of SS generosity. 
A.1.4 Other microdata 
Encuesta de Estructura Salarial: It was carried out by INE in 1995. It provides 
detailed information on wages, working hours and personal characteristics for 
about 175,000 workers in 19,000 establishments. 
Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares: This is a rotating household 
survey carried out quarterly by INE since 1985. It collects data on income, 
consumption and personal characteristic for about 3,000 households. One eigth 
of the sample is replaced at each rotation. 
A.2 Aggregate annual or monthly data 
Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales: Published by the Ministry of Labor (MTSS), 
it contains data from 1981 on the most important SS programs. 
Boletin Informativo de la SS: Published by the Direcci6n General de la 
SS, MTSS, it contains detailed information on social security expenditures, 
including medical care, from 1981. 
Encuesta de Salarios en la Industria y los Servicios: It is a quarterly survey 
on wages and hours worked carried out by INE at the establishment level. 
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B Overview of the literature on SS and retirement 
in Spain 
We have been able to trace the existence of only one investigation of the impact 
of the Spanish SS system upon labour supply and, in particular, retirement 
decisions. Martin and Moreno (1990) look at weekly work hours over the period 
1964-84 using net and gross SS wealth as explanatory variables. A fairly simple 
econometric analysis leads to the conclusion that the negative income effect 
associated to SS contributions more than compensate for both the susbstitution 
effect toward leisure and the increase in expected wealth induced by the promise 
of a pension payment, thereby increasing the overalllabor supply. 
The rest of the existing literature concentrates almost exclusively upon two 
issues: 
1. The financial evolution of the system and the dramatic increase in its 
current account deficit as a consequence of both the system's generosity 
and the adverse demographic evolution. 
2. The redistributive features of the system and, in particular, the existence 
of a wide dispersion in the internal rates of return across different pro-
grams. 
B.l Analysis of the long-run sustainability 
Recent years have witnessed the publication of a large number of studies con-
cerned with the long-run viability of the Spanish public pension system and with 
its capability to sustain the undergoing demographic changes. Among them are 
the monographs by Barea (1995), Barea et al. (1996), Herce et al. (1995), IN-
VERCO (1996), Ministerio de Trabajo (1995), Piiiera and Weinstein (1996), as 
well as the interesting papers by Herce (1997) and Jimeno and Licandro (1996). 
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While the various authors reach different conclusions upon the type of re-
form which would result more appropriate, they pretty much express similar 
concerns about the economic viability of the existing system. 
Normalizing at zero the deficit of the Social Security system in 1995, the 
estimates for 2010 range from -.8 to -3.5 percent of the GDP, with an average of 
-1.5 percent. For 2025 the average deficit prediction is of -2.6 with a range going 
from -1.0 to -4.2 percent of GDP. Most studies are based on a set of macroeco-
nomic predictions that, while not exagerately optimistic, are nevertheless not 
obviously achievable. In general an average growth rate of GDP at 3 percent 
per year is assumed, together with a substantial increase in labor participation 
rates (up to 70 percent in 2010) and a reduction in the unemployment rate fromt 
he current 23 percent to about 16-18 percent. Barring substantial structural 
reforms these predictions are hardly realistic in the light of the performances of 
the Spanish economy over the last 20 years. 
B.2 Analysis of the redistributive effects 
Most studies concentrate upon the period prior to the 1978 reform and only a 
few are able to cover more recent years. The unit of investigation is always the 
individ ual agent, not the household, and income is very often measured as an 
annual flow and not as total lifetime income. 
For the earlier period there is a widespread consensus on the regressive 
nature of the combined SS and fiscal system [see, e.g. Castellano (1977) and 
Vereda and Moch6n (1978)]. The studies we have exhamined, though, are rather 
imprecise and nai"ve in both their theoretical apparatus, the quality of'the data 
available and the econometric techniques adopted. We find their conclusions 
rather dubious. 
After 1978 things look quite different. While an early study [Argim6n 
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and Gonzalez-Paramo (1987)] still finds evidence of a regressive effect in the 
structure of contributions, this is not the case when pension expenditures are 
taken into consideration [Medel et al. (1988)]. More recently a number offairly 
complete studies [(Monasterio and Suarez (1992), Melis and Diaz (1993) and 
Bandres and Cuenca (1996)] unequivocally document the very strong and pro-
gressive redistribution accomplished by the post-1978 and post-1985 Spanish 
pension systems. 
These more recent studies do not restrict their analysis to annual income 
flows but manage to construct relatively credible indeces of life-time contribu-
tions and payments according to professional status and decile position in the 
overall distribution of earnings, and to compute internal rates of returns for 
different SS programs and income profiles. 
Their, fairly uniform conclusions, can be summarized as follows: 
• For most SS programs, both past and current contribution/payment pro-
files give rise to a rather large intergenerational transfer. For example, the 
ratio of net transfers to the total present value of pensions for individuals 
affiliated to the REEH went from 61.2 percent before the reform to 52 
percent after (using a discount rate of 3 percent) . 
• The only important exception to this rule is given by the general scheme 
before and, especially, after the 1985 reform. In this case, the net lifetime 
SS wealth was positive (and equal to about 30 percent of total pension 
present value) before the reform, only if a real discount rate of 1 percent 
were used. It turned negative when a 3 percent discount rate was applied, 
and it remained negative in either cases after the reform. It turns out 
to be particuarly large (50 percent of total pension present value) when 
discounted at 3 percent. 
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• Both the old and the current Spanish SS systems generate very large 
intragenerational transfers from the general to all the special schemes. 
Domestic workers and small farmers are by far the largest beneficiaries of 
such transfers. 
• If one looks at the intragenerational transfers occurring not across pro-
grams but across income deciles, the Spanish SS system turns out to be a 
very progressive one: up to 90 percent of the total present value of pen-
sions to which individuals in the first decile ofthe earnings distribution are 
entitled are a pure transfer. This transfer's percentage decrease rathers 
slowly as one moves up with earnings and changes sign only for the very 
last decile (or the last two, depending on details of the calculations). 
54 
Tal::le 1: Annual growth rates of real pension expenditures, number of pen-
sions and real average pension (1994 prices), 1980-1995. Source: Ministerio de 
Trabajo (1995). 
Type of pension Total 
Old-age Disability Widows Orphans Other reI. 
Pension expenditures 
80-85 5.5 9.3 4.6 3.2 4.9 6.4 
85-90 5.9 3.5 7.8 2.2 3.5 5.5 
90-95 5.8 3.9 6.3 1.4 6.3 5.3 
Number of pensions 
80-85 2.4 7.3 4.7 2.5 3.7 4.2 
85-90 2.9 1.6 4.0 1.0 3.0 2.8 
90-95 3.2 1.3 3.5 .7 12.1 2.8 
A verage pension 
80-85 1.8 1.3 -.9 .3 -1.1 1.1 
85-90 2.7 2.3 3.7 1.4 .9 2.6 
90-95 2.4 2.2 2.7 .3 -4.7 2.3 
Table 2: Floors and ceilings on monthly earnings (1000 pta. at current prices). 
Professional category 1990 1996 
floor ceiling floor ceiling 
Engineers and college graduates 87.150 291.540 113.070 374.880 
Technical engineers 72.270 291.540 93.780 374.880 
Supervisors and foremen 62.820 291.540 81.510 374.880 
Administrative assistant 58.350 291.540 75.690 374.880 
Clerks 58.350 185.820 75.690 279.390 
Janitors 58.350 164.400 75.690 279.390 
Clerk Assistants 58.350 164.400 75.690 279.390 
Table 3: Replacement rates by age and number of years of contribution. 
Years of Age 
contribution 60 61 62 63 64 65+ 
15 .360 .408 .456 .504 .552 .600 
20 .420 .476 .532 .588 .644 .700 
25 .480 .544 .608 .672 .736 .800 
30 .540 .612 .684 .756 .828 .900 
31 .552 .626 .699 .773 .846 .920 
32 .564 .639 .714 .790 .865 .940 
33 .576 .653 .730 .806 .883 .960 
34 .588 .666 .745 .823 .902 .980 
35+ .600 .680 .760 .840 .920 1.000 
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Table 4: Annualized minimum wage (S~lI) and minimum and maximum annual 
pensions (1000 pta. at current prices). 
Annualized Minimum pension Maximum 
Year SMI With dep. spouse Without dep. spouse pension 
< 65 > 65 < 65 > 65 
1985 520.380 355.530 406.000 336.490 384.860 2631.300 
1986 561.960 399.000 455.840 364.000 417.200 2631.300 
1987 590.100 430.920 492.310 412.860 442.260 2631.300 
1988 616.560 465.500 532.000 411.040 471.100 2631.300 
1989 650.720 520.870 595.350 441.490 505.960 2710.400 
1990 700.140 575.820 658.140 488.040 559.300 2900.128 
1991 745.500 614.460 702.240 520.800 596.820 3094.448 
1992 787.920 649.530 742.280 550.550 630.840 3270.834 
1993 819.420 682.710 780.150 578.690 663.040 3437.644 
1994 847.980 712.810 814.520 604.170 692.230 3557.960 
1995 877.800 744.240 850.360 630.770 722.750 3714.508 
1996 908.880 770.350 880.180 652.890 748.090 3877.944 
Table 5: Percentage ratio between the number of disability pensions paid and 
the number of workers covered by the various SS programs, 1981-1994: General 
Fund (RGSS), self-employed (RETA), agricultural employees (REAa), farmers 
(REAb), coal miners (REMC), sailors (RETM), domestic workers (REEH). 
Year RGSS RETA REAa REAb REMC RETM REEH Total 
1981 .79 1.06 2.29 2.14 2.33 - 2.32 1.10 
1982 1.15 1.06 3.17 2.34 3.61 - 2.79 1.45 
1983 1.31 1.03 3.02 2.33 3.21 - 2.88 1.54 
1984 1.17 .83 2.41 2.14 2.91 - 2.57 1.33 
1985 .72 .58 1.61 1.80 1.52 - 2.48 .90 
1986 .62 .57 1.67 1.97 1.80 1.58 1.93 .83 
1987 .55 .51 1.34 1.84 1.42 1.34 2.00 .72 
1988 .52 .51 1.21 2.06 1.69 1.45 2.21 .70 
1989 .43 .43 1.13 1.95 1.64 1.12 2.25 .60 
1990 .44 .51 1.21 2.38 2.36 1.22 2.90 .62 
1991 .41 .57 1.30 2.58 2.18 1.18 3.30 .62 
1992 .47 .64 1.37 2.53 2.37 1.26 3.12 .67 
1993 .47 .68 1.25 2.15 2.29 1.25 2.85 .64 
1994 .44 .77 1.35 1.91 2.03 1.24 2.75 .61 
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Table 6: Fraction of new disability pensions awarded to individuals aged 55+ by 
SS program and level of disability: Inability to do the usual job (IPT), inability 
to do any kind of job (IPA), complete inability (GI). Year 1994. 
Program IPT IPA GI 
RGSS 4.0 43.5 39.3 
RETA 53.4 64.4 49.3 
REA 58.5 63.7 68.9 
REMC .3 48.6 60.0 
RETM 14.9 32.1 32.0 
REEH 25.0 75.0 80.6 
Table 7: Incentive calculations for base case. After-tax values in 1000 pta. at 
1995 prices. 
Age at last Replacem. SSW Accrual Accrual Projected Taxi 
year of work rate rate earnings subsidy 
54 11343.7 1533.6 
55 11006.9 -336.8 -.030 1557.5 .216 
56 10836.9 -170.0 -.015 1572.4 .108 
57 10598.0 -238.9 -.022 1558.8 .153 
58 10025.0 -573.1 -.054 1582.3 .362 
59 .590 9566.8 -458.2 -.046 1603.8 .286 
60 .661 9809.7 242.9 .025 1625.2 -.149 
61 .730 10008.0 198.3 .020 1648.2 -.120 
62 .816 10193.3 185.3 .019 1648.6 -.112 
63 .895 10117.1 -76.2 -.007 1649.4 .046 
64 .996 9860.6 -256.5 -.025 1606.9 .160 
65 .998 8629.4 -1231.3 -.125 1627.5 .757 
66 .996 7364.4 -1264.9 -.147 1648.4 .767 
67 .988 6067.9 -1296.5 -.176 1669.6' .777 
68 .981 4815.7 -1252.2 -.206 1691.0 .741 
69 .973 3608.2 -1207.5 -.251 1712.7 .705 
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Table 8: Incentive calculations for the case of a single worker. After-tax values 
in 1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last Replacem. SSW Accrual Accrual Projected Taxi 
year of work rate rate earmngs subsidy 
54 9159.8 1533.6 
55 8847.4 -312.4 -.034 1557.5 .201 
56 8697.0 -150.4 -.017 1572.4 .096 
57 8459.9 -237.1 -.027 1558.8 .152 
58 7897.5 -562.4 -.066 1582.3 .355 
59 .590 7449.4 -448.1 -.057 1603.8 .279 
60 .661 7570.2 120.8 .016 1625.2 -.074 
61 .730 7553.3 -17.0 -.002 1648.2 .010 
62 .816 7501.2 -52.1 -.007 1648.6 .032 
63 .895 7226.1 -275.1 -.037 1649.4 .167 
64 .996 6802.1 -424.0 -.059 1606.9 .264 
65 .998 5616.4 -1185.7 -.174 1627.5 .729 
66 .996 4421.8 -1194.6 -.213 1648.4 .725 
67 .988 3222.7 -1199.1 -.271 1669.6 .718 
68 .981 2078.4 -1144.2 -.355 1691.0 .677 
69 .973 989.5 -1088.9 -.524 1712.7 .636 
Table 9: Incentive calculations for the case of incomplete earnings history. 
After-tax values in 1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last Replacem. SSW Accrual Accrual Projected Taxi 
year of work rate rate earnings subsidy 
54 10446.4 1533.6 
55 10022.4 -424.0 -.041 1557.5 .272 
56 9664.3 -358.1 -.036 1572.4 .228 
57 9406.9 -257.5 -.027 1558.8 .165 
58 9005.5 -401.4 -.043 1582.3 .254 
59 .536 8687.4 -318.1 -.035 1603.8 .198 
60 .613 8886.4 199.0 .023 1625.2 -.122 
61 .691 9253.5 367.1 .041 1648.2 -.223 
62 .787 9670.8 417.3 .045 1648.6 -.253 
63 .880 9851.4 180.6 .019 1649.4 -.109 
64 .996 9860.6 9.3 .000 1606.9 -.006 
65 .998 8629.4 -1231.3 -.125 1627:5 .757 
66 .996 7364.4 -1264.9 -.147 1648.4 .767 
67 .988 6067.9 -1296.5 -.176 1669.6 .777 
68 .981 4815.7 -1252.2 -.206 1691.0 .741 
69 .973 3608.2 -1207.5 -.251 1712.7 .705 
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Table 10: Incentive calculations for the 10th percentile earnings case. After-tax 
values in 1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last Replacem. SSW Accrual Accrual Projected Taxi 
year of work rate rate earnings subsidy 
54 10621.0 889.8 
55 10334.2 -286.9 -.027 904.1 .317 
56 10052.2 -282.0 -.027 913.1 .309 
57 9776.9 -275.2 -.027 904.9 .304 
58 9513.9 -263.0 -.027 919.0 .286 
59 .741 9255.8 -258.1 -.027 931.9 .277 
60 .731 8444.5 -811.3 -.088 944.8 .859 
61 .722 7659.2 -785.3 -.093 958.6 .819 
62 .810 6954.4 -704.8 -.092 958.9 .735 
63 .892 6431.7 -522.7 -.075 959.3 .545 
64 .996 6070.7 -361.0 -.0.56 933.8 .387 
65 .998 5342.6 -i28.1 -.120 946.2 .770 
66 .996 4604.1 -738.5 -.138 958.8 .770 
67 .988 3855.8 -748.4 -.163 971.5 .770 
68 .980 3132.6 -723.1 -.188 984.4 .735 
69 .972 2435.9 -696.7 -.222 997.4 .698 
Table 11: Incentive calculations for the 90th percentile earnings case. After-tax 
values in 1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last Replacem. SSW Accrual Accrual Projected Taxi 
year of work rate rate earnings subsidy 
54 18450.0 2561.6 
55 17800.3 -649.7 -.035 2603.0 .250 
56 17427.6 -372.7 -.021 2630.5 .142 
57 16829.3 -598.3 -.034 2610.5 .229 
58 15565.3 -1264.0 -.075 2631.4 .480 
59 .561 14789.6 -775.7 -.050 2666.6 .291 
60 .627 15210.1 420.6 .028 2701.7 -.156 
61 .691 15398.5 188.4 .012 2739.6 -.069 
62 .776 15711.9 313.4 .020 2740.2 -.114 
63 .859 15710.4 -1.5 -.000 2741.5 .000 
64 .966 15490.9 -219.4 -.014 2671.6 .082 
65 .982 13769.4 -1721.5 -.111 2705.6 .636 
66 .996 12002.4 -1767.0 -.128 2739.9 .645 
67 .988 9802.4 -2200.0 -.183 2774.7 .793 
68 .981 7677.5 -2124.9 -.217 2809.9 .756 
69 .973 5628.5 -2049.0 -.267 2845.6 .720 
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Table 12: Tax/subsidy rates with and without minimum pensions. 
Age at last Base case incomplete history 10th percentile 
year of work with without with without with without 
55 .216 .172 .272 .058 .317 .150 
56 .108 .050 .228 -.052 .309 .027 
57 .153 .123 .165 -.000 .304 .101 
58 .362 .372 .254 .217 .286 .355 
59 .286 .284 .198 .141 .277 .267 
60 -.149 -.221 -.122 -.331 .859 -.264 
61 -.120 -.127 -.223 -.256 .819 -.172 
62 -.112 -.112 -.253 -.254 .735 -.161 
63 .046 .046 -.109 -.109 .545 .001 
64 .160 .160 -.006 -.006 .387 .118 
65 .757 .757 .757 .757 .770 .738 
66 .767 .767 .767 .767 .770 .751 
67 .777 .777 .777 .777 .770 .762 
68 .741 .741 .741 .741 .735 .726 
69 .705 .705 .705 .705 .698 .691 
Table 13: Age-distribution of new pensioners, 1991 and 1994. 
1991 1994 
Age Penalty Ko Penalty Total Penalty No Penalty Total 
~ 60 38.61 1.81 40.42 37.84 2.89 40.73 
61 5.91 .32 6.23 7.20 .34 7.54 
62 5.72 .27 6.00 7.39 .35 7.74 
63 4.71 .51 5.22 6.13 .34 6.46 
64 4.22 1.83 6.04 5.22 2.25 7.47 
65 - - 31.38 - - 26.39 
66 - - 1. 71 - - 1.17 
67 - - .93 - - .72 
68 - - .58 - - .50 
69 - - .41 - - .39 
> 70 - - 1.07 - - .89 
< 65 59.17 4.74 63.92 63.79 6.16 69.95 
> 65 - - 36.08 - - 30.05 
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Figure 1: Age structure of the population of working age (16+) by sex and 
year. 
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Figure 2: Historical trends in labor force participation of older men. 
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Figure 3: Historical trends in labor force participation of older women. 
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Figure 4: Fraction of workers covered by the SS system . 
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Figure 5: Old-age and survivors' (OAS) and disability (DJ) pension recipiency 
among people aged 55+. 
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Figure 6: Replacement rates. 
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Figure 7: Participation rates by age and sex. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of activities of men by age. 
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Figure 9: Distrihution of activities of women by age. 
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Figure 10: Public income recipiency by age for men. 
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Figure 11: Distribution of family income 'ly source. 
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Figure 12: Distribution of affiliated to SS by program: General scheme (RGSS), 
self-employed (RETA), agricultural workers and small farmers (REA), domestic 
workers (REEH). Annual averages 1982-1996. 
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Figure 13: Fraction of pensioners receiving complements to the minimum and 
share of the pension due to complements by number of years of contribution, 
1993. 
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Figure 14: Distribution of male disability pensions outstanding in 1993 by age 
group and year of award. 
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Figure 15: Tax/subsidy rates across earnings profiles. 
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Figure 16: Hazard rate out of the labor force for men . 
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Figure 17: Hazard rate out of the labor force for women . 
. 9 
.B 
.7 
.6 
.5 
.4 
.3 
.2 
.1 
0 
45 50 55 60 65 69 
age 
77 
WORKING PAPERS 1997 
Business Economics Series 
97-18 (01) 
97-23 (02) 
97-24 (03) 
97-29 (04) 
97-30 (05) 
97-31 (06) 
97-32 (07) 
97-52 (08) 
Margarita Samartin 
"Optimal allocation of interest rate risk" 
Felipe Aparicio and Javier Estrada 
"Empirical distributions of stock returns: european securities markets, 1990-95" 
J avier Estrada 
"Random walks and the temporal dimension of risk" 
Margarita Samartin 
"A model for financial intermediation and public intervention" 
Clara-Eugenia Garcia 
"Competir,g trough marketing adoption: a comparative study of insurance 
companies in Belgium and Spain" 
Juan-Pedro G6mez and Fernando Zapatero 
"The role of institutional investors in international trading: an explanation of the 
home bias puzzle" 
Isabel Gutierrez, Manuel Nunez Niekel and Luis R. G6mez-Mejia 
"Executive transitions, firm performance, organizational survival and the nature of 
the principal-agent contract" 
Teresa Garcia and Carlos Ocana 
"The role of banks in relaxing financial constraints: some evidence on the 
investment behavior of spanish firms" 
Economics Series 
97-04 (01) 
97-05 (02) 
97-06 (03) 
97-07 (04) 
97-09 (05) 
Ifiigo Herguera and Stefan Lutz 
"Trade policy and leapfrogging" 
Talitha Feenstra and Noemi Padr6n 
"Dynamic efficiency of environmental policy: the case of intertemporal model of 
emissions trading" 
Jose Luis Moraga and Noerni Padr6n 
"Pollution linked to consumption: a study of policy instruments in an 
environmentally differentiated oligopoly" 
Roger Feldman, Carlos Escribano and Laura Pellise 
"The role of government in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection" 
Juan Jose Dolado and Juan F. Jimeno 
"The causes of Spanish unemployment: a structural V AR approach" 
